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Notes from the Border:
Writing Across the Administrative
Law/Financial Regulation Divide
Robert B. Ahdieh
A central feature—if not the central feature—of legal scholarship today is
analysis across divides.
It is perhaps surprising, then, how little has been written across the seemingly
thin divide that separates administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation. To
be sure, the cross-fertilization of administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation
scholarship and practice is not without its challenges—including a number
grounded in the self-reinforcing norms and expectations of legal academia.
Such norms can change, however, and they should.
The beneﬁts of increased engagement across the administrative law/ﬁnancial
regulation divide are substantial. Consider the various other occasions for
analysis across divides that deﬁne legal scholarship today: interdisciplinary
studies, comparative law, legal history, and even the common law method writ
large.
Over the past ﬁfty years, interdisciplinary study—the analysis of questions
across the divide between disciplines—has come to dominate legal scholarship.
Law and economics has been described as “the most successful intellectual
movement in the law of the past thirty years.”1 From a few scholars, at a few
schools, writing on a few subjects, it has established its place in nearly every
ﬁeld, at nearly every law school in the United States, and even overseas. But
law and economics is far from unique in that regard.
Starting from the seminal work of Lawrence Friedman, Marc Galanter,
Stewart Macaulay, David and Louise Trubek, and others, the study of law and
society has enjoyed similarly wide—if distinct—inﬂuence. Law and psychology,
law and politics, and law and philosophy have each secured a wide following
as well. The “law and . . .” movement thus captures much of the history of legal
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scholarship over the past half-century2—and arguably represents the dominant
approach to legal scholarship today.
Long before the rise of interdisciplinary studies, comparative law scholars
can be understood to have engaged in an analogous exercise. No less than
scholars of law and economics or law and psychology, comparativists sought
insight in analyzing questions across relevant divides. Their divides were
simply ones of geography, rather than disciplines. If one hopes to understand
the role of consideration in our common law system—as I tell my contracts
students—one might ﬁnd greater insight in the absence of that doctrine in civil
law jurisdictions than anywhere else.
The work of legal historians might be framed in a similar light. Rather than
a geographic divide, however, the scholar of legal history seeks insight across
divides of a temporal nature. Our understanding of modern-day admiralty
law is thus signiﬁcantly enhanced by reference to the lex mercatoria and even
Roman law.
One might even understand doctrinal legal scholarship to turn on
analysis across divides of a sort. The essence of the common law—and of
scholarly analysis of it—is the task of distinguishing cases. It is precisely in
the distinctions among cases—in relevant divides—that common law reasoning
ﬁnds opportunity for doctrinal evolution.
Legal scholars do not lack appreciation, then, of the utility of analysis
across divides. The absence of such analysis in the study of administrative law
and ﬁnancial regulation is thus something of a mystery. Perhaps especially
so, given the modest nature of the relevant divide: one that is intra- rather
than interdisciplinary, one that operates within rather than across geographic
boundaries, and one that involves no temporal dimension but operates entirely
within current-day law.
For all the proximity in their interests, targets of study, and even analytical
tools, however, scholars of administrative law and of ﬁnancial regulation
(including securities regulation, in particular) have shown strikingly little
interest in one another. Analysis across this narrow divide has been all but
nonexistent; scholars of each discipline rarely read one another, cite one
another, or even talk to one another.
To engage this peculiar lacuna in the legal literature, this essay proceeds in
four stages. First, I review the history of the divide, as well as recent eﬀorts to
bridge it. Second, I outline core characteristics of the divide: the two ﬁelds’
distinct motivations, divergent assumptions about the market, and particular
limitations. With a clearer picture of the nature of the divide, I suggest some
of the insights that might be gained from engagement across it. Finally, I
conclude by acknowledging the challenges attendant to writing across the
administrative law/ﬁnancial regulation divide—while also highlighting the
need to overcome those challenges.
2.
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History of the Administrative Law/Financial Regulation Divide
Notably, the divide between administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation
cannot be traced to the genesis of each body of law—or to the scholarly work
that initially emerged around them. To the contrary, during the New Deal, the
overlap of administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation was substantial.
That overlap began with the centrality of the ﬁnancial markets—and the
need to regulate them more eﬀectively—as key drivers in the emergence of
the administrative state. Financial regulation can thus be understood as a
critical impetus for the elaboration of a law and jurisprudence of government
administration. Agencies oriented to ﬁnancial regulation were among the ﬁrst
administrative agencies, meanwhile, and among the most important ones
established during the New Deal.3 The engagement of federal regulation with
state law also saw some of its earliest manifestations in the realm of ﬁnancial
regulation, including with reference to state Blue Sky Laws.4
The close connection between the study/practice of administrative law and
ﬁnancial regulation in the early days of each ﬁeld might be seen even more
vividly in the career of James Landis. A professor of legislation at Harvard Law
School, Landis was invited to Washington at the urging of Felix Frankfurter,
to help draft what became the Securities Act of 1933. Upon establishment
of the Securities and Exchange Commission the following year, Landis was
appointed a member, and subsequently as its second chairman.
Landis is equally well-known, however, as author of The Administrative Process—
drafted during his tenure as chairman of the Commission and published
immediately after, when he stepped down to become the Dean of Harvard
Law.5 From the date of its publication and for decades thereafter, Landis’s work
stood as the leading defense of the rise of the administrative state. Further, it
heavily inﬂuenced the design of the Administrative Procedure Act—the core
framework of administrative law to this day.
In subsequent years, however, the disciplines drifted apart. No single
explanation accounts for the shift, but a number of contributing factors might
be identiﬁed. Gillian Metzger, to begin, points to the changed focus of federal
rulemaking in the 1960s and 1970s. In its origins, economic regulation—utility
regulation, ratemaking, common carrier rules, entry controls, and the like—
represented the primary content of federal regulation. Over time, however,
environmental and health risks, among other social concerns, emerged as
alternative—and even dominant—areas of focus. With that shift, scholars of
administrative law increasingly found themselves in conversation with their
3.
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and Exchange Commission (1934).
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public law colleagues. Scholars of ﬁnancial regulation, by contrast, gravitated
to the private side of the academic house, engaging their business law
colleagues.
Another likely factor behind the growing divide was the pattern of increased
specialization in legal scholarship generally.6 The strong emphasis on ensuring
independence in ﬁnancial regulation—in some contrast with the emphasis
of administrative law on accountability—may also have been important.7
To related eﬀect may have been the greater role of internal and political
checks in ﬁnancial regulation, as manifest in its reliance on multimember
commissions and distinct interest-group dynamics.8 Following directly from
those diﬀerences, in turn, was each ﬁeld’s distinct approach to judicial review.9
One might also consider a more fundamental reason scholars of
administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation might have gone their separate
ways. The ﬁelds are, in a sense, engaged with fundamentally diﬀerent
questions. Administrative law focuses on question of process, separate and
apart from any given area of law. Financial regulation, by contrast, is one such
substantive area of law—akin to environmental law, workplace health and
safety law, and the like. As obvious as that contrast might seem, however, it
cannot alone explain the sharp divide in the study of administrative law and
ﬁnancial regulation. Scholars of substantive environmental law and workplace
health and safety law thus engage regularly with scholars of administrative
law. Not uncommonly, in fact, they are the same people.
Whatever the precise origins of the administrative law/ﬁnancial regulation
divide, recent engagement across it may suggest it can be bridged. For the
most part, such engagement has not been explicit. Rather, it emerges in the
work of scholars conversant in both bodies of law, some of whose writing looks
to one of the relevant literatures in attempting to engage the other.
David Zaring’s scholarship may be most notable in that regard. In work
on the appropriate level of transparency in ﬁnancial regulation, for example,
Zaring has drawn on insights from administrative law.10 Conversely, exploring
the impact of globalization on administrative law, he has taken lessons from
the experience of ﬁnancial regulation.11 Analogously, some of my own work—
6.

See David K. Levi & Mitu Gulati, “Only Connect”: Toward a Uniﬁed Measurement Project, 58 DUKE
L.J. 1181, 1182 (2009) (noting increased specialization of legal scholarship).
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See Robert B. Ahdieh, Reanalyzing Cost-Beneﬁt Analysis: Toward a Framework of Function(s) and
Form(s), 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1983, 2004 (2013); Metzger, supra note 7, at 133.
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(2013); see also David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 95 MINN. L. REV. 187 (2010).
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including on the Securities and Exchange Commission’s construction of
a National Market System and on monetary policymaking by the Federal
Open Market Committee—has sought to engage both bodies of scholarly
work.12 Scholarly analysis of the extension of cost-beneﬁt analysis to ﬁnancial
regulation in recent years might also be cited in this regard.13
Of late, moreover, scholars have begun to engage the divide more explicitly.
In Through the Looking Glass to a Shared Reﬂection: The Evolving Relationship Between
Administrative Law and Financial Regulation, Gillian Metzger highlights diﬀerences
in the focus of each discipline and the institutions that characterize it, as
well as the ways in which the global ﬁnancial crisis may have helped to draw
them closer together.14 Responding to Metzger’s analysis, Tom Merrill has
questioned the viability of meaningful analysis across the administrative law/
ﬁnancial regulation divide, let alone closer alignment in relevant regulatory
practices—given what he describes as the “quicksilver” problem in ﬁnancial
regulation.15 Jacob Gerson, ﬁnally, cites the ﬁnancial crisis as the source of
signiﬁcant shifts in our framework of administrative law—to embrace a role for
so-called “superagencies,” to encourage what he terms a “web of jurisdiction”
approach to agency authority, and to increase reliance on statutory deadlines
to shape agency action.16
The scope of this recent engagement should not be overestimated, however.
By way of a bit of loose empiricism, I conducted a quick search of Westlaw’s
database of journals and law reviews (JLR) for articles with “securities
regulation,” “securities law,” or “ﬁnancial regulation” in the title, and found
1133 pieces.17 Among those, only sixty-ﬁve included any textual reference to the
basic administrative law terminology of “notice and comment” or “arbitrary
and capricious.” Whatever might have been read into that small number a
decade ago, one might have expected to ﬁnd more today—some ﬁve years after
a seminal ruling of the D.C. Circuit on the arbitrary and capricious nature of
a highly visible Dodd-Frank Act rulemaking by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.18
12.

See Robert B. Ahdieh, From Fedspeak to Forward Guidance: Regulatory Dimensions of Central Bank
Communications, 50 GA. L. REV. 213 (2015); Robert B. Ahdieh, Law’s Signal: A Cueing Theory of Law
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Nature of the Administrative Law/Financial Regulation Divide
Whatever the historical origins and future of the administrative law/
ﬁnancial regulation divide, it is useful to understand its key characteristics
today. Consider three critical points of diﬀerentiation: First, what motivates
each ﬁeld of law—and the scholarly analysis thereof? Second, what are the
assumptions about the market against which each ﬁeld operates? Finally, what
constraints does the regulatory project face in each ﬁeld? However much our
answers might change over time, signiﬁcant diﬀerences might be identiﬁed
today, across each of these areas.
Motivations/Goals
Central to the project of administrative law are the intertwined goals of
transparency and accountability. With the delegation of signiﬁcant regulatory,
adjudicatory, and enforcement authority to unelected agency oﬃcials, the
Administrative Procedure Act, the jurisprudence that has emerged around
it, and the associated scholarly literature have sought to deﬁne appropriate
limitations on agency power.19 In particular, Congress, the judiciary, and the
academy have called for signiﬁcant transparency in agencies’ procedures and
sought to hold them accountable for their actions through both judicial and
political review—the former imposed explicitly and the latter encouraged and
facilitated, including by way of enhanced transparency.20
In ﬁnancial regulation as well, one might ﬁnd some emphasis on transparency
and accountability. Some meaningful interest in fealty to statutory text—or at
least to those texts that oﬀer some meaningful degree of precision—might be
seen to reﬂect those goals. One might also see them reﬂected more directly,
including in the broad orientation of ﬁnancial regulation to disclosure,21 in
increasingly robust rulemaking processes,22 and in the accountability generated
by the collaborative nature of Securities and Exchange Commission decisionmaking, especially given its politically diverse membership.23
Any orientation to transparency and accountability in ﬁnancial regulation
should not be overstated, however. One might identify some desire—and even
need—to limit transparency and accountability in ﬁnancial regulation. As I
will suggest below, a high level of transparency might conﬂict with eﬀective
regulation of the ﬁnancial markets, as in the problematic consequences of giving
19.

See PETER H. SCHUCK, FOUNDATIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 53 (1994) (suggesting due
process functions of the Administrative Procedure Act).

20.

See Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: Building the Legal Infrastructure
for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WISC. L. REV. 297, 342.

21.

See Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences for Securities
Regulation, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 418 (2003).

22.

See, e.g., Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Scott Garrett,
Representative, U.S. House of Representatives 2 (Aug. 5, 2011).

23.

See Bressman & Thompson, supra note 8, at 610.
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market participants notice of potential agency action.24 As for accountability,
meanwhile, relevant interest groups’ focus on particular ﬁnancial regulators
can be expected to be quite intense, given the ﬁnancial consequences of
their alternative regulatory choices. Heightened political accountability, as a
consequence, has the potential to serve as a path to increased, rather than
decreased, interest group inﬂuence.
The primary focus of ﬁnancial regulation, instead, is on two other goals—
and on achieving an appropriate equilibrium between them: namely, the
protection of shareholders and investors more generally, and the raising of
capital via eﬃcient markets. As the Securities and Exchange Commission
summarizes its mission, it seeks “to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly,
and eﬃcient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”25
One can see echoes of transparency and accountability in that mandate,
of course. As suggested above, however, the goals of investor protection and
market eﬃciency may—perhaps as often as not—best be secured by reduced
transparency, and even diminished accountability. Even where transparency or
accountability is the goal, meanwhile, ﬁnancial regulation might well pursue
that goal in ways distinct from those demanded by administrative law.
Distinct Assumptions About the Market
Distinct assumptions about the market also contribute to the divide
between the study/practice of administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation.26 In
administrative law, the market represents the structure to be policed by way of
eﬀective regulation. Much of the work of administrative agencies can thus be
understood as responses to perceived market failures.
Financial regulation, by contrast, engages the market as something to be
facilitated—even encouraged. Of course, regulation must ensure eﬃciency of
the market. That caveat aside, however, a role for regulation in facilitating
markets diﬀers markedly from the project of correcting market ineﬃciencies.
This distinctive attitude of each ﬁeld toward the market should not be
exaggerated, of course. Financial regulation places signiﬁcant limitations
on markets as well, from disclosure requirements and anti-fraud regulation
to capitalization requirements and licensure rules. Certain other ﬁelds,
meanwhile, also embrace a role for agencies in market facilitation. Aspects
of telecommunications regulation—and government standard-setting
generally—can be understood in that light. Certain aspects of natural resource
management and energy policy are to similar eﬀect. Nowhere is the task of
market facilitation and encouragement as direct, however, as in ﬁnancial
regulation.
24.

See infra note 28 and accompanying text.

25.
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Constraints on Regulatory Process and Design
The divide between the study/practice of administrative law and ﬁnancial
regulation also turns on distinct constraints on the eﬀective application of
each body of law. A number of such limitations might be highlighted, but let
me emphasize just two—time and space—that can be expected to impact each
ﬁeld in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ways.
Consider time: In questioning the viability of any convergence—or even
meaningful engagement—of administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation, Tom
Merrill calls attention to the capacity for quick exit in the ﬁnancial markets.27 In
many—if not most—of the areas in which administrative law has been applied,
the entities and assets subject to regulation are not capable of rapid relocation.
Railroads, for example, are literally nailed to the ground.
By contrast, money is highly mobile—and even fungible. That is in its very
nature. It is even more true today, however, as a result of fast-moving—even
instantaneous—trading technologies. Increasingly globalized capital markets
further ease exit, as do sophisticated ﬁnancial instruments, including everchanging synthetic products not susceptible to sustained regulation.
Given as much, Merrill suggests the deliberative and intentionally slowmoving processes at the heart of administrative law are likely to have little to
oﬀer in ﬁnancial regulation. Between the rapidity of capital movement and
the pace of innovation, the market can be expected to get ahead of almost
any potential regulatory intervention—let alone one that emerges with the
methodical pace required by administrative law.
Consider, for example, the placement of banks and other systemically
important ﬁnancial institutions into receivership.28 In the case of banks,
relevant federal agencies have long been permitted to proceed expeditiously
and in secret to avoid both the classic “run on the bank” and potential assetstripping moves by incumbent managers. In extending those agency powers
from banks to a broader range of ﬁnancial institutions, the Dodd-Frank Act
insisted on judicial review of agencies’ receivership decisions. But consider
the legislation’s limitations on that review, in the name of expedition and
conﬁdentiality: The judicial process is itself to be secret, with signiﬁcant
criminal sanctions for those who disclose even the fact of such review. The
judge must rule within twenty-four hours, is permitted to evaluate only two
of the seven factors that the agency weighed in its decision, and must do so
under a relatively permissive “arbitrary and capricious” standard of review.
After the court’s decision, meanwhile, no stays are permitted pending appeal,
and no injunctive relief is available against the receiver. The discrepancy
between this process and administrative law’s expectations of transparency
and accountability, of course, could not be more stark.
Beyond such constraints of time—the relative need for expedition in ﬁnancial
regulation, as compared with administrative law—certain constraints of space
27.

See Merrill, supra note 9.

28.

See id. at 197-99.

72

Journal of Legal Education

might also be understood to distinguish ﬁnancial regulation and administrative
law. For much federal regulation—and hence for administrative law—an entirely
domestic reach is likely to be suﬃcient. Vehicle safety regulation, workplace
health and safety rules, and even a great deal of environmental protection play
themselves out almost entirely at the national (or even subnational) level.
It is almost impossible, by contrast, to approach ﬁnancial regulation from
a purely domestic perspective. Whatever select questions might be engaged
in that fashion, they represent the exception rather than the rule in ﬁnancial
regulation. From audit committee composition requirements to questions
of extraterritorial enforcement, the Securities and Exchange Commission
must attend to both static and dynamic reactions to its regulatory initiatives
overseas. One might even see the progressive advance of ﬁnancial market
regulation from state-level to federal-level regulation, and the ensuing (and
still developing) role of federal regulators in shaping transnational regulatory
processes—including the much-discussed rise of transnational regulatory
networks29—as indicative of the progressively expanding geographic reach of
ﬁnancial regulation.
That said, distinctions of space in administrative law and ﬁnancial
regulation may be diminishing. To a growing degree, regulators outside the
ﬁnancial arena face the need to consider the transnational dynamics associated
with their regulatory choices. Climate change and internet regulation are only
the most obvious examples.
Learning Across the Divide
There exists, then, a real—if perhaps shifting—divide in the study/practice
of administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation. Might it be useful to bridge
that divide? What might we learn from scholarly engagement across it?
Before suggesting a handful of particular opportunities for learning across
the administrative law/ﬁnancial regulation divide, it may be useful to return
to where we started. How should we understand the beneﬁts of other analyses
across divides—interdisciplinary scholarship, comparative legal analysis,
legal history, and engagement across distinct legal disciplines, from torts and
criminal law to antitrust and consumer protection?
In each analysis, we gain something from studying the distinct motivations,
assumptions, and modes of thinking of the “other.” Economic analysis may
help us better evaluate the eﬃcacy of damages versus speciﬁc performance as
a remedy in contract law.30 German civil procedure may suggest the limitations
of an adversarial approach to expert testimony.31 An awareness of the origins
29.

See Robert B. Ahdieh, Coordination and Conﬂict: The Persistent Relevance of Networks in International
Financial Regulation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75 (2015); Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to
Global Standards: Private, Regulator, and Ministry Networks, 109 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015).
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TEX. L. REV. 831 (2006).

31.
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of the hearsay rule may clarify its appropriate application today.32 And our
understanding of culpability in criminal law may be enriched by studying the
principles of liability in tort law.33
Something similar might be expected across the gap that divides the study
of administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation. Consider, once again, questions
of secrecy and conﬁdentiality. As described above, ﬁnancial regulators must
necessarily proceed with secrecy in placing a bank or other systemically
important ﬁnancial institution into receivership. The same is true of their
routine interest-rate setting decisions, as well as their response to nonroutine
incidents of ﬁnancial panic. Even fairly mundane regulatory and adjudicatory
tasks may require conﬁdentiality where proprietary business data must be
evaluated.
Such pressures are less likely to be present—at least ordinarily—in
administrative law. On the other hand, administrative law has had the beneﬁt
of decades of experience navigating the trade-oﬀ between transparency and
eﬃciency. In fostering the eﬃcacy of agencies’ regulatory undertakings,
thus, administrative law scholars have been forced to grapple with just the
question faced by students of ﬁnancial regulation: the appropriate limits of
transparency.34 Scholars of ﬁnancial regulation would do well, as such, to
engage the principles of transparency developed in administrative law.
Financial regulation scholars might also learn something from administrative
law, practice, and scholarship as they seek to promote increased regularity
in relevant decision-making procedures. Elements of the administrative law
framework of external accountability may thus oﬀer insight into procedures for
the generation of internally oriented guidance and interpretations—which play
a relatively more central role in ﬁnancial regulation, for the reasons of secrecy
outlined above.
In precisely that spirit, I have explored the ways in which the Federal Open
Market Committee embraced something more of a “rulemaking” approach
as it sought to respond to the Great Financial Crisis.35 In seeking to bend
the curve of long-term interest rates, with short-term rate targets already at
zero, the Committee increasingly relied on communication as a tool of monetary
policy. In doing so, however, it needed to introduce signiﬁcantly enhanced
32.

See John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1904).

33.

See David J. Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the Early Common Law, 76 B.U. L. REV.
59 (1996). An analogous case for integrating administrative law and immigration law has been
oﬀered by Chris Walker. See Chris Walker, The Costs of Immigration Exceptionalism, http://www.
yalejreg.com/blog/the-costs-of-immigration-exceptionalism-by-chris-walker.

34.

See Daniel E. Andersen, Straddling the Federal-State Divide: Federal Court Review of Interstate Agency
Actions, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1610 (2016) (“Eﬃciency often comes at the expense of
accountability and vice versa.”); see also Sidney A. Shapiro, The Top Ten Reasons that Law Students
Dislike Administrative Law and What Can (Or Should) Be Done About Them?, 38 BRANDEIS L.J. 351, 35960 (2000).

35.
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dimensions of notice and reason-giving into its decision-making procedures—
echoing precisely the demands of notice-and-comment rulemaking.
No less opportunity exists for administrative law scholars to learn from
ﬁnancial regulation. A succession of D.C. Circuit decisions over the last
decade, for example, imposed signiﬁcant cost-beneﬁt analysis requirements on
the Securities and Exchange Commission. In particular, the Business Roundtable
decision of 2011 held the Commission’s economic analysis of its proposed
proxy access rule to be arbitrary and capricious—a signiﬁcant departure from
past judicial practice with regard to ﬁnancial regulation.36
For precisely that reason, the decision provides an important opportunity
for learning in administrative law. In exploring the extension of cost-beneﬁt
analysis into a new and complex area, administrative law scholars have
the opportunity to gain new insight into its nature.37 This begins with the
possibility of a broader range of potential forms of cost-beneﬁt analysis than
have commonly been acknowledged. It also raises questions of function,
including the need to move away from a singular emphasis on eﬃciency as the
operative goal of cost-beneﬁt analysis. No less, the study of cost-beneﬁt analysis
in ﬁnancial regulation raises important questions about the appropriate scope
of judicial review of such analysis. Ultimately, by exploring the application of
cost-beneﬁt analysis in ﬁnancial regulation, administrative law scholars may
come to embrace a more ecumenical conception of the nature of—and the
appropriate approach to—cost-beneﬁt analysis.38
Challenges of Crossing the Divide
However much scholars of administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation
might stand to learn from one another, signiﬁcant challenges face those who
seek to bridge the divide. Three issues are particularly salient: audience,
authority, and advancement. While not insurmountable, each of these barriers
is substantial.
As things stand today, scholars of administrative law and ﬁnancial
regulation write in diﬀerent journals, attend diﬀerent conferences, and sit on
diﬀerent panels, even when they attend conferences directed to both. When
given the opportunity to sponsor joint programs on topics of mutual interest—
as at the annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools—they do
so less often than one might hope. Scholarship in each ﬁeld, as such, speaks to
entirely diﬀerent audiences. And eﬀorts to write across the ﬁelds face resulting
diﬃculties of appropriate starting points, framing, and language.
The challenges of audience in administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation are
likely aggravated by broader trends in audience selection in legal scholarship.
36.

Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

37.
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The narrowcasting of scholarly writing in law is a pattern many decades in the
making. That trend has likely accelerated in recent years, with the growth in
online distribution—often directed to one, relatively narrow audience.
The (eminently reasonable) drive to reduce the length of law review articles
might also contribute to challenges of audience in bridging the gap between
administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation. Given a need to limit the length of
one’s submitted work, the natural place to trim is in background and context.
Yet those are precisely the elements that make scholarly work accessible to
those outside the author’s ﬁeld—perhaps especially for those writing in a more
technical ﬁeld, such as ﬁnancial regulation.
Questions of audience lead directly to questions of authority. Administrative
law and ﬁnancial regulation scholars, perhaps unsurprisingly, cite very diﬀerent
sources. Consider, by way of example, the Supreme Court’s pair of decisions
in SEC v. Chenery—both staples of the administrative law canon.39 For all their
importance in administrative law, the cases are of little relevance in ﬁnancial
regulation. They are rarely cited, and most assuredly are not central to the
jurisprudence of securities law, notwithstanding their genesis in that ﬁeld.
The same might be said of the case law generally—as well as relevant treatises
and the secondary literature cited by scholars in each ﬁeld. Loss & Seligman’s
seminal treatise on securities law is unlikely to be cited by administrative law
scholars—even in analyzing a securities law case.40 Nor would the Administrative
Law Treatise, ﬁrst prepared by Kenneth Culp Davis more than a half-century
ago and now authored by Richard Pierce, likely be cited by those writing on
ﬁnancial regulation.41 No law review article on administrative law, meanwhile,
is likely to be chosen for inclusion on one of the various annual lists of “top
ten” works in corporate and securities law. And vice versa.
One might also see something of the challenge of divergent authority in the
quasi-constitutional status of the Administrative Procedure Act in the study of
administrative law. The Act enjoys no similar stature in scholarship on ﬁnancial
regulation. Rather, the substantive legislation that undergirds the latter—the
Securities Act, the Securities Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act,
and the Investment Advisers Act, among other major statutes—enjoy pride
of place. These are not inherently exclusive sources, of course. In practice,
however, things tend to work out that way—with attendant implications for the
ease of writing across the two ﬁelds.
Finally—and not unrelated to the challenges of audience and authority—
writing across the administrative law/ﬁnancial regulation divide also raises
signiﬁcant questions of professional advancement. The diﬃculties begin with
one’s home institution.
39.

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).

40.

LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION (5th ed. 2014).

41.

RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE (4th ed. 2002).

76

Journal of Legal Education

In setting one’s teaching priorities, in the selection of scholarly mentors,
in the distribution of drafts, and the like, focus is invaluable. At a minimum,
this arises from scarcity of time. But it also responds to something more
fundamental: what might be understood as lawyers’ natural tendency toward
classiﬁcation. For reasons of both simpliﬁcation and measurement/evaluation,
thus, we are apt to deﬁne our colleagues as working in one given ﬁeld versus
another.
A similar dynamic plays itself out beyond one’s home institution. In
receiving invitations to speak at relevant symposia (and even general
workshops, depending on how speakers are chosen), in securing mentors,
and otherwise, having a singular ﬁeld of expertise can be valuable. With such
focus, one might expect to achieve greater recognition and renown—at least
within a given ﬁeld.
Of course, such external concerns come to a head in the context of tenure
and promotion reviews. From the ability of any given reviewer to engage
the full scope of one’s work to the prospect of a reviewer having some prior
familiarity with it, a risk-averse strategy would likely favor writing in one
ﬁeld—both in terms of the scope of any given piece of writing, and in terms of
one’s overall work.
Broadly, the challenges of advancement in writing across ﬁelds of law come
down to the question of who one is as a scholar. Consider, thus, the diﬃculty we
would have in characterizing someone who wrote in two entirely disconnected
ﬁelds—perhaps environmental law and antitrust law. The diﬃculty should be
less daunting in administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation, of course. Given
the reality of that divide as it stands today, however, an author writing across
the ﬁelds might likely still seem like neither ﬁsh nor (scholarly) fowl.
Of course, the challenges of advancement are not insurmountable ones. My
own approach, thus, has been to engage the questions I found interesting, and
let things to play out as they might. I recognize, however, that I may have had
the luxury of doing so in ways that others might not. More telling, though,
may be my usual counsel to young scholars with interests in multiple ﬁelds:
Do as I say, not as I did.
The norms and expectations that undergird that advice, however, are not
ﬁxed. Neither are currently prevailing practices in promotion and tenure. Even
audiences may be more malleable than we assume. Consider where we started:
the interdisciplinary engagements of the “law and . . .” movement. Hard as it
may be for us to imagine today, little or no audience existed for economic—
or political science, psychological, or literary—analysis in law schools a
half-century ago. Might an audience for scholarship at the intersection of
administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation simply be just around the corner?
Conclusion
As the impact and inﬂuence of interdisciplinary scholarship, comparative
legal studies, legal history, scholarly work across other distinct legal ﬁelds, and
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perhaps even the common law method make clear, legal analysis across divides
has the potential to oﬀer us signiﬁcant insight. Across methods and even
ﬁelds, there is much to be gained from the eﬀort. Whatever the challenges,
thus, scholars of administrative law and ﬁnancial regulation do well to engage
one another more actively. As the early shoots of such engagement begin to
emerge, we would be wise to nurture and encourage them.

